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MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion. . . . If there are any circumstances which permit an exception they
do not occur to us.
-Justice Jackson1
I. INTRODUCTION
Without doubt, education is a major function of modem American govern-
ment. All fifty states have a public school system and practically all have com-
pulsory education laws. 2 At the federal level the Secretary of Education is a
cabinet level official. The Supreme Court has said that "[p]roviding public schools
ranks at the apex of the function of a State."' 3 Education, however, is also very
important to parents because the subject goes to the heart of what many parents
consider a fundamental right: rearing their children as they think best.
Because parents often disagree with state officials about the structure and
content of the public school system, many parents opt to remove their children
from the public school system and instead to use private education programs.
Christian religious conviction is often (though far from always) the motivation
of the parents who object to the public schools. Parents with strong religious
convictions often feel that educating their children in an environment where
religious emphasis is a consistent and integrated part of the learning process
is a vital point to which their religion directly speaks. The issue for these par-
ents is often one of sin and righteousness; if God has spoken, then there is little
room for debate in their minds.I These parents basically want the state educa-
tion officials to leave them alone to provide their children education as they
see fit (and, presently, at their own expense) .
5
1. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
2. See W. VALENTE, LAW IN THE SCHOOLS 24-25 (1980). For a more recent compilation, see Klicka,
Home Statute Chart of the 50 States (May 1987) (available from Home School Legal Defense Association,
731 Walker Road, Suite E-2, Great Falls, VA 22066). For a general history of compulsory education in
the United States, see Tyack, Ways of Seeing: An Essay on the History of Compulsory Schooling, 46 HARV.
EDUC. REV. 355 (1966).
3. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972).
4. See, e.g., New Life Baptist Church Academy v. Town of East Longmeadow, 666 F. Supp. 293,
297 (D. Mass. 1987) (Plaintiffs were Christians who "believe that they are obligated by God to provide as
an indispensable ministry of their church a school which teaches their religious beliefs . . . . Plaintiffs be-
lieve they are forbidden to send their children to schools, such as public schools, which they believe teach
doctrines contrary to the Holy Scriptures."); State v. Patzer, 382 N.W.2d 631, 633, cert. denied, 479 U.S.
825 (1986) (The "parents essentially believe that God has given them sole responsibility to educate their
children.").
5. For a developed argument that parental control rather than state control of education is a major premise
of Christian belief, see Titus, Education: Caesar's or God's: Constitutional Question of Jurisdiction, J. CHRIST.
Juis. 101 (1982).
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The state, on the other hand, perceives that its interest in education ex-
tends to private education programs as well as public education. The two state
interests in education which the Supreme Court has recognized are: (1) ensur-
ing that children receive the basic skills to be self-reliant, competent
citizens, 6 and (2) inculcating in children the values essential for democra-
cy.7 These interests (and especially the latter) are sometimes contrary to the
values of the parents' Christian faith. As a result, conflict is inevitable. The
state claims that its interests must be met even if it means overriding parental
choice, and the parents claim that the state action overriding their choice vio-
lates their religious freedom under the first amendment. These conflicts have
been and continue to be the focus of legal battles across the country.8
This article shall examine these conflicts between separatist parents and
the state. Specifically, this article shall consider whether, and to what extent,
the state can regulate private Christian education programs in light of the first
amendment free exercise clause. Part II will first define and describe the strug-
gle between the parents and the state as one for the right to control, or at least
have the greatest influence over, what children believe. Part III will then exa-
mine the legal test the courts currently use in free exercise clause cases under
the first amendment. The conclusion reached is that the current standard is not
protective enough of parental liberty and, as a result, a revised standard is neces-
sary. The final segment, Part IV, suggests a revised standard based on princi-
ples drawn from the jurisprudence of the first amendment free speech clause.
6. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221-22.
7. See Bethel School Dist. v. Frazer, 478 U.S. 675, 681-86 (1986); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 864 (1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979).
8. For a sampling of the cases, see, e.g., Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 815 F.2d 485 (8th
Cir. 1987); New Life Baptist Church Academy v. Town of East Longmeadow, 666 F. Supp. 297 (D. Mass.
1987); Nebraska ex rel. Douglas v. First Baptist Church, 207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d 571 (1981); Kentucky
State Bd. v. Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980); State v. Whisner, 47
Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976).
Many of the disputes between separatist parents and the states involve conflicts about the legality of
home schools. See, e.g., Duro v. District Attorney, 712 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1983); Care and Protection of
Charles, 399 Mass. 324, 504 N.E.2d 592 (1987); State v. Patzer, 382 N.W.2d 631, cert. denied, 479 U.S.
825 (1986); Delconte v. State, 313 N.C. 384, 329 S.E.2d 636 (1985).
From August 1986 through May 1987, the Home School Legal Defense Association, a legal defense
fund, helped 353 families (who wanted to home school their children) in their contacts with public school
officials or state attorneys. Of these 353 contacts, 37 had either been resolved in court or were presently
in court as of spring 1987. Contact Countdown, 13 THE Ho, E SCH. CT. REP. 2 (Mar.-Jun. 1987).
For two views of home education, see Lines, An Overview of Home Instruction, PHI DELTA KAPPAN,
Mar. 1987, at 510, 517; Zirkel, Defense of Home Instruction Not Warranted, 'Eouc. WEEK, Oct. 30, 1985,
at 19.
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II. WHO WILL CONTROL WHAT THE CHILD IS TAUGHT?
A. A Struggle for the Power to Control Belief Formation
At the most fundamental level, the battle between the state and parents for
control of the child's education is a struggle to influence how the child thinks,
and thus the battle is really a struggle for power. Social scientists have long
understood that power is the essence of social science, 9 and by far the most
potent and the most significant instrument of power is the ability to control what
other people believe. 10 Whoever controls what a child learns has tremendous
impact on the formation of the child's beliefs.
Both the state and Christian doctrine recognize the importance of formal
education in the power struggle. In the landmark case of Pierce v. Society of
Sisters,1 1 the Supreme Court recognized that allowing the state to mandate com-
pulsory education in public schools only would make the child the "mere crea-
ture of the state,"' 2 and thus the Court struck down Oregon's compulsory
education law. In the more recent case of Wisconsin v. Yoder 1 3 concerning the
Amish people, the Supreme Court recognized that complete state control of edu-
cation would likely destroy the Amish way of life. 14 Moreover, the Supreme
Court has given indirect tribute to the power of religious education to influence
belief by finding that merely the symbolic effect of having secular education
and sectarian education occurring in the same building is likely to further religion
in the minds of impressionable young children. 15
For Christian parents, the recognition of the power of belief formation is
found directly in the Bible. The Apostle Paul wrote that Christians should "be
not conformed to this world: but be ye transformed by the renewing of your
mind, that ye may prove what is that good, and acceptable, and perfect, will
of God." 16 Likewise, the writer of Proverbs wrote: "For as he thinketh in his
heart, so is he . .. ,,17 Christ himself said, "whosoever believeth [in me shall]
not perish, but [shall] have everlasting life."18 An oft-quoted passage that con-
nects the formation of belief with education is: "Train up a child in the way
9. See generally A. BERLE, POWER (1969); J. GALBRAITH, THE ANATOMY OF POWER (1983); B. Rus-
SELL, POWER: A NEW SOCIAL ANALYSIS (1938).
10. John Kenneth Galbraith, for example, argues that women and men on both sides of the feminist move-
ment fight the most difficult battle not at the level of compensation and equal opportunity laws but rather
at the level of belief. See J. GALBRAITH, supra note 9, at 4-5.
11. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
12. Id. at 535.
13. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
14. Id. at 218.
15. See School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389-92 (1985) (holding in part that the
provision of government funded special instruction in religious school buildings creates a symbolic link be-
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he should go: and when he is old, he will not depart from it." 19 These are but
a few of the passages in the Bible which can be used to directly support the
overriding importance of belief formation to the Christian parent. 20
B. The Issue of Children's Rights
On occasion, a commentator will suggest that characterizing the battle for
control as one between the state and parents ignores the rights of the child. As
an example, the late Justice Douglas argued that parents should not be able ex-
clusively to control what the child is taught, but this right instead belonged to
the child himself, and thus the child's view must be canvassed and assessed. 21
This argument, however, evades the control (or power) issue in the modem
education setting. Compulsory education laws presuppose that the child is not
in a position to make an informed, wise judgment. By passing compulsory edu-
cation laws, the state is not saying that the child should control his own educa-
tional destiny. Instead, the obvious implication is that a more informed party -the
state -must make the decision for the child until a certain age is reached. On
this issue, parents who object to state regulation of private education agree with
the state; the only disagreement is about who should make the decision -the
parents or the state.
C. The Case for Parental Control
In fact, there are very strong reasons for allowing parents to make the de-
cision, the foremost of which is the fact that parents are in the best position
to know their child's needs. Parents live with the child and teach him or her
to walk, talk, eat, tie shoes, and perform a myriad of other tasks essential to
getting along in society. The state, however, by necessity, categorizes children
in broad groups. If the child is not "typical," then he or she is liable to be the
one who suffers.
Although the state can try through special needs programs to give individu-
alized attention, it is the parent who is in the position to have the most in-depth,
and thus most insightful, opinion. 22 In the case of handicapped children, for
example, state officials must rely on interview sessions to evaluate the child's
needs. As one professional educator who specializes in special education has
noted, such sessions are often ineffective because the child will not respond
readily to a stranger. As a result, the parent must be relied upon to supply much
19. Proverbs 22:6.
20. See supra note 5.
21. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241-49 (1972).
22. See D. SEELEY, EDUCATION THROUGH PARTNERSHIP: MEDIATING STRUCTURES AND EDUCATION
143-44 (1981).
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of the relevant information. 23 Children without handicaps also need individu-
alized attention. Since parents, again, are in the best position to give this in-
dividualized attention, then it stands to reason that allowing the parent to do
so by structuring the child's education will benefit the child and society.
Moreover, it must be remembered that in deciding what is best for the child
the issue is not whether parents are perfect, but whether they are more likely
to make the better choice than educational experts operating in a bureaucratic
institutional setting. As David Seeley in his book, Education Through Partner-
ship, notes:
It bears saying, too, that many public school officials have little experience
or expertise in choosing schools for children. Students are usually assigned to
public schools by geographic zone and grade level. They often know little about
individual records of performance or psychological traits, two important factors
in making good decisions for a child. Even incompetent parents usually know
a great deal about their children; and more parents than are given credit by ex-
perts care very deeply about those they bring into the world. 24
Parental control also has broader benefits because the family is a fundamental
social institution and thus is crucial to the success of other societal func-
tions. 25 When the values a child receives in school conflict with those trans-
mitted by the family, the child's education suffers. As sociologist Sara Lawrence
Lightfoot of Harvard University has written:
If one recognizes the initial social and cultural task assumed by all families
and their primary educative function, then it becomes clear that in order for schools
to be productive and comfortable environments for children, they will have to
meaningfully incorporate the familial and cultural skills and values learned in
homes and communities. When families and schools share similar values, cultur-
al perspectives, educational goals, and modes of expression, then the transposi-
tion from family education to schooling is more fluid and less conflictual for the
child. On the other hand, when schools and families support dissonant values
and goals, and when families and communities are perceived as inadequate and
chaotic environments by arrogant and threatened school personnel, then educa-
tion within families is devalued and systematically excluded from the school
culture ....
Children seem to learn and grow in schools where parents and teachers share
similar visions and collaborate on guiding children forward. For a long time,
we have understood that the magic of suburban schools is not merely the relative
affluence and abundant resources of the citizens (nor their whiteness), but also
23. Telephone interview with Tom Hehir, Director of Special Education in the Boston Public Schools
(Feb. 13, 1988).
24. D. SEELEY, supra note 22, at 146.
25. For a developed discussion of the family as a social institution, see D. SEELEY, supra note 21, at
163-77; cf Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (institution of the family deeply rooted
in the nation's history and tradition).
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the consonance between what the parents want for their children and what the
teachers believe is educationally sound.
26
Parental control of choice in education will ensure that the child is in an en-
vironment where the values of the school personnel coincide with those of the
family. Moreover, parental control should strengthen the family unit itself be-
cause of the sense of bonding and identity that stems from active involvement
in the education process by all members of the family. 27
The importance of the family is even more paramount if one views cultur-
al pluralism and diversity as beneficial values in society. Although some might
argue that public education is pluralistic because of local community control,
the facts do not seem to bear this premise out. The original purpose of public
education, at least in part, was to assimilate people from different cultures into
an Anglo-American culture, 28 and the same is true today in many respects.
As an example, many oppose bilingual education in the public schools because
it arguably will hamper children's ability to become effective members of Ameri-
can society. 29 Such an attitude presupposes that there is a common culture which
distinguishes a person as an American without promoting or violating the values
of any individual group. The result, however, is often a watered-down, com-
mon denominator type of curriculum and value system which decreases diver-
sity rather than stimulates it. 30 Parental choice in education, however, assumes
just the opposite. Rather than seeking a common denominator, parental control
allows children to develop in the many individual directions represented by the
differing groups in society. As a result, family control of education not only
preaches but also actually promotes pluralism.
D. An Adversarial Environment
Perhaps the real tragedy of the power struggle to control how children think
is that parents and state educators are working against each other rather than
working together. Educators for the most part seem to be dedicated, idealistic
people who both believe in the work they perform and have a genuine concern
for children. As for parents who want to educate their child in a manner the
state educators feel is too unorthodox, the fact that the parents care enough to
26. S. LIGHTFOOT, WORLDS APART: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FAMILIES AND SCHOOLS 170-171 (1978).
27. Id. at 145; see supra note 24.
28. See S. LIGHTFOOT, supra note 26, at 13-15, 56-58.
29. George Gilder, for example, has written: "These actions [i.e., bilingual education] simultaneously
undermine the group's entry into American life and culture, segregate it in presumably separate but equal
classrooms, often run, according to many reports, by anti-American teachers, and open the group chiefly
to two influences: Spanish-speaking politicians with an interest in segregation and Spanish translations of
bureaucratic social programs." G. GILDER, WEALTH & POVERTY 151 (1982).
For a summary of federal government action and state government action relating to bilingual educa-
tion, including state attempts to institute official language policies, see Note, "Official English ": Federal
Limits on Efforts to Curtail Bilingual Services in the States, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1345 (1987).
30. D. SEELEY, supra note 22, at 16-18, 58.
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show an active interest in their child's education indicates a level of commit-
ment that should be encouraged. Since both groups are motivated to help the
children, one would hope and think that they would use this common ground
to support each other even if there is not total agreement. The tragic reality,
however, is that educators often view parents as threats .
31
This attitude on the part of educators has been attributed to many sources,
the foremost of which is money. Public schools are funded at a level directly
related to the number of children who attend public schools. In most school
districts, the number of teachers in a school is determined by the average daily
attendance. 32 If more parents opt for private education, as has been the case
in recent years, 3 3 there will be less money and a lower number of teaching
positions allocated to public schools. Educators, despite their idealism, surely
worry about job security as much as other individuals.
Another suggested source of hostility can be labeled "professional pater-
nalism." To teach in a public school, a person usually needs a minimum of a
bachelor's degree; and if he or she is serious about a teaching career, a master's
degree is a de facto requirement. Given such educational requirements, it is
understandable why professional educators might consider "untrained" parents
to be unqualified to make educational decisions about their children's wel-
fare .3 4 This paternalistic attitude is even more likely when parents are propos-
ing educational programs radically different from those developed by the public
school experts. Rather than accepting the proposed alternative as a legitimate
option, the temptation is to view a different proposal as an attack on their com-
petence and the quality of their program.
The hostile relationship and resulting legal confrontations that often de-
velop between educators and parents cannot be blamed solely on these two fac-
tors. Many educators undoubtedly do not let such factors influence their judgment
but instead act as public servants in the truest sense. Even so, the fact that edu-
cators have a substantial financial interest, plus an interest in professional identity,
in keeping children in the public education system should raise a warning flag
about improper motives or bias that might cause educators to disfavor parental
choice that threatens the educators' personal interests. Yet when parents ob-
ject, these same state educators are the ones who initially decide if the parents
31. See S. ARONS, COMPELLING BELIEF: THE CULTURE OF AMERICAN SCHOOLING 104-17 (1986).
32. Id. at 161- 63.
33. Approximately five million students attended nonpublic schools in 1981, and eighty-four percent
of these schools were religiously affiliated. M. MCCARTHY, A DELICATE BALANCE: CHURCH, STATE, AND
THE SCHOOLS 143-44 (1983). Since 1975, enrollment in nonpublic schools has increased while enrollment
in public schools has decreased. D. SEELEY, supra note 22, at 257. According to one report, when North
Carolina eliminated state programmatic restrictions and teacher qualifications, thirty-two new private schools
started within six months. M. MCCARTHY, supra, at 147.
34. See Lupu, Home Education, Religious Liberty, and the Separation of Powers: A Comment on Care
and Protection of Charles, 72 MASS. L. REV., Sept. 1987, at 47, 52-53; see generally M. FRIEDMAN &
R. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 150-71 (1980) (arguing for free access to private education through a voucher
plan and describing the resistance from professional educators to such a plan).
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are qualified to guide the child's education under standards that give the state
educators broad power.
E. The State-Controlled Approval Process
State regulation of private education is common and extensive. States vary
in their requirements, but the most contested areas are curriculum controls and
teacher certification. 35 Such requirements (and especially the latter type) can
present a significant bar to Christian parents who are not members of mainline
and thus more wealthy, establishment-oriented denominations, but who yet feel
a vital part of their faith, is educating their children in an environment where
the entire process -from curriculum content to the role model presented by the
teacher- reinforces the particular beliefs of the parents' faith. 36
Some states simply require that the instruction in private education pro-
grams be "equivalent" to that in the public schools 37 and then vest approval
authority at the local school board or superintendent level. Massachusetts' method
of approving private schools is a case in point. There are no state approval stan-
dards in Massachusetts other than very general statutory provisions. Instead,
each school district is expected to develop its own specific standards. 38 In the
experience of one attorney who has handled several cases for parents attempt-
ing to gain approval of private education programs, the result is an administra-
tive nightmare for parents in the state who desire unconventional private education
plans such as home schooling. Parents never know what to expect because the
responses vary greatly depending on the attitudes and opinions of individual
school superintendents.
39
Part of this problem is directly attributable to the courts. Even when courts
35. For a compilation of different requirements in different states, see Klicka, supra note 2. See also
D. KRiP AND M. YUDOF, EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 45-46 (1982).
36. See supra note 3.
37. In the case of private home schools, for example, seven states (Connecticut, Indiana, Kansas, Maine,
New Jersey, Nevada, and South Carolina) require the instruction to be "equivalent." Three states (Maryland,
Delaware, and Rhode Island) require the instruction to be "regular and thorough"; two states (Idaho and
Michigan) require the instruction to be "comparable." Klicka, supra note 2 (summary of the 50 states home
school laws as of May, 1987).
Such "equivalent" instruction statutes have been successfully attacked at times as being unconstitutional-
ly vague (see, e.g., Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 815 F.2d 485, 495-96 (8th Cir. 1987)); but in
other cases, the requirements have been upheld as providing sufficient guidance. See Care and Protection
of Charles, 399 Mass. 324, 329-33, 504 N.E.2d 592, 596-98 (1987).
38. Telephone interview with Marien E. Evans, Assistant General Counsel, Boston Public Schools (Nov.
1987). See also Memorandum to School Committee Chairpersons from Harold Raynolds, Jr., Massachusetts
Commissioner of Education (Apr. 17, 1987) (discussion of individual school districts' authority to regulate
home schools); Memorandum to School Committee Chairpersons from John H. Lawson, former Massachusetts
Commissioner of Education (Aug. 19, 1982). This latter memorandum is a discussion of individual school
districts' authority to approve private schools in general (as opposed to specifically in the home education
context). Both of the above-mentioned memoranda are available through the Legal Counsel Office of the
Boston Public Schools, 26 Court Street, Boston, MA 02108.
39. Interview with Paul Dillon, Attorney at Law, in Mr. Dillon's office in Falmouth, MA (Jan. 29, 1988).
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have vindicated parents' rights in legal battles with state authorities, the method
of the vindication has sowed seeds of further confrontation. The recent Mas-
sachusetts case of Care and Protection of Charles4° is a good example of this
problem. Charles involved a Massachusetts couple who wanted to teach their
children at home but who could not reach agreement with school officials of
the town of Canton, Massachusetts, on the acceptable form of schooling. When
the children were held out of school for a semester due to the disagreement,
the town instituted "care and protection" proceedings in state court to remove
the children from the parents for lack of "'necessary and proper educational
care.' "41
The legal standard interpreted by the Charles court provided that "every
child between the minimum and maximum ages established for school atten-
dance . . . [shall] . . . attend a public day school . . . but such attendance shall
not be required . . . of a child who is being otherwise instructed in a manner
approved in advance by the superintendent or the school committee. '"42 The
court held that this approval criterion was not unconstitutionally vague because
the superintendent could flesh out the criteria via supplementation from other
state laws concerning education. 43 Then the court also held that teacher cer-
tification itself cannot be used as a requirement nor can a college degree be
required of the parents, but school officials could look at the instructional material
to determine what will be taught, the length of the school year, and the com-
petency of the parents to teach. The court then remanded the case for the par-
ents and school authorities to develop a solution acceptable to both. " As one
commentator described the decision, "fiun essence, the Court validated in prin-
ciple the permissibility of home education, subject to a process of official ap-
proval on matters of curriculum, teacher competence, textbook adequacy, and
pupil progress.
4 5
Given the flexibility of such standards, local public school officials thus
still can make it very difficult for parents to exercise their liberty right in edu-
cation and child rearing should the officials so desire. The scene is set for fur-
ther confrontation, administrative delay, and generally a spirit of adversity rather
than cooperation. Often the disagreement is so severe that the conflict ends up
in court.
40. 399 Mass. 324, 504 N.E.2d 592 (1987).
41. Id. at 325, 504 N.E.2d at 594 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. chap. 119, § 24 (West 1987)).
42. Id. at 333, 504 N.E.2d at 598 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. chap. 76, § I (West 1987)).
43. Care and Protection of Charles, 399 Mass. at 329-33, 504 N.E.2d at 596-98.
44. Id. at 337- 40, 504 N.E.2d at 600-02.
45. Lupu, supra note 34, at 47.
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III. THE LEGAL STANDARD
A. Background Supreme Court Decisions
The first Supreme Court decision directly addressing state regulation of
private education was Meyer v. Nebraska, 46 where the Court struck down a
Nebraska statute that made it a criminal offense for a public or private school
teacher to teach a language other than English to students below high school
level. Two years later the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Pierce
v. Society of Sisters.41 In Pierce, state authorities, under the authority of a com-
pulsory education statute, wanted to prohibit parents from sending their chil-
dren to private school instead of public school. Two private schools were
involved -one a Catholic school and the other a military academy. Relying on
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court held
that a parent has a right to choose private education rather than the public edu-
cation provided by the state."4
Pierce was a victory for parents, but the victory is pyrrhic because the de-
cision also contains the seeds of extensive state regulation of private education.
The Court, in dicta, said:
No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regu-
late all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils;
to require that all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall
be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly
essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught which
is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.
49
Although Pierce gives parents the right to choose private education, the deci-
sion also gives the state considerable power to regulate private education, perhaps
to such an extent that the parents' choice may be one of form rather than sub-
stance. The Pierce parents won the battle, but they arguably lost the war.
In Farrington v. Tokushige 51 the Supreme Court further defined the due
process limits of state regulation. Farrington concerned the teaching of Japanese
in private foreign language schools in the territory of Hawaii prior to state-
hood. The contested state regulation included time limits, content control, English
language emphasis requirements, a permit, and a loyalty pledge .5 1 The Court
struck down these regulations on the ground that the state cannot regulate "the
intimate and essential details" of a private school so that the public officers ef-
fectively control the school .5 2
46. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
47. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
48. Id. at 535.
49. Id. at 534.
50. 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
51. Id. at 291-97.
52. Id. at 298.
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B. The Legal Standard Under the Free Exercise Clause
When parents want to educate their children privately because of religious
conviction, they will probably frame their claim in first amendment free exer-
cise terms rather than in strictly due process terms. The leading free exercise
decision concerning state regulation of education is Wisconsin v. Yoder. 53
In Yoder the Supreme Court held that Wisconsin's compulsory education
law was an unconstitutional burden on the free exercise rights of the Amish
people. In so holding, the Yoder Court laid down a three-prong test for evalu-
ating free exercise of religion claims. To sustain the claim, Yoder said a court
must find that there is a "legitimate religious belief," the exercise of which is
denied or burdened by a state requirement, and that there is not a "state interest
of sufficient magnitude" to override the religious claim. 4 The Yoder Court was
not clear whether this standard was one of pure ad hoc balancing or whether
the test placed a higher burden on the state. In the recent case of Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Commission of Florida, 55 however, the Supreme Court
cleared the confusion and confirmed that free exercise clause claims are sub-
ject to strict scrutiny. The state therefore bears the burden of proof to establish
not only that the state concern is compelling, but also that the state action is
the least restrictive means of achieving the state interest. 
56
1. The Sincerity of a Religious Belief
Generally the courts do not heavily question the religious sincerity or
legitimacy of the claimed religious belief. The courts seem to recognize that
religious belief is by nature subjective, and as a result courts are not competent
to question the sincerity of the beliefs. As the Supreme Court said in Thomas
v. Review Board: "The resolution of that question [i.e., what is a religious be-
lief or practice) is not to turn upon a judicial perception of the particular belief
or practice in question; religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, con-
sistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protec-
tion ."57
2. Determining Whether There Is a Burden
In contrast to the attitude of the courts on the sincerity issue, in analyzing
whether there is a burden on the believer's belief, the courts have not respected
the believer's subjective feelings but instead have characterized this prong as
53. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
54. Id. at 214.
55. 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
56. Id. at 139-44.
57. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707. 714 (1981).
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an objective standard. 5 8 Unfortunately, this characterization fails to recognize
that whether state action conflicts with the believer's belief, and thus burdens
that belief, depends entirely on the subjective nature of the belief itself. When
a court finds in a particular case that the believer's religious belief is sincere
but that a burden does not exist, the court has effectively said that the court
itself understands the believer's religion better than the believer himself. In ad-
dition to being presumptuous, the inquiry necessary to such an approach vio-
lates the principle that courts are not to become involved in interpreting the
details of church doctrine or a believer's faith. 19
A related problem is that such an approach also leaves far too much lati-
tude for judges to deny a claim without inquiring into the state's concern. If
the court is willing to manipulate the burden prong so as not to find a conflict
between the believer's belief and the state action, it is immaterial, at least in
theory, whether the state's interests and means are subjected to strict scrutiny
because the court need not address whether the state interest is compelling or
whether the state action is the least intrusive means available. Even the most
unreasonable state interest or means can be upheld. As a result, the extra pro-
tection contemplated by the strict scrutiny test is eviscerated. Two recent fed-
eral court decisions dealing with education illustrate this problem.
a. Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton
In Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 60 the plaintiffs were two fundamen-
talist private schools plus their pastors, principals, some of the teachers, some
of the parents and the students. The plaintiffs objected to Iowa's requirement
that all teachers in private schools be certified by the state. 61 To be certified
under the Iowa law, a person had to graduate from an approved school or com-
plete a minimum number of courses in professional education, including courses
in human relations to develop "'sensitivity to and understanding of the values,
beliefs, life styles and attitudes of individuals and the diverse groups found in
a pluralistic society.' "62
In analyzing the free exercise claim and then holding that Iowa's teacher
certification requirement did not violate the plaintiffs' free exercise rights, the
58. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-19; see also Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protec-
tive Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (construction of road by government adjacent to Indian tribal worship places
not a burden on Indians' free exercise interests).
59. See Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449-52 (1969) (holding that courts may not resolve civil disputes between church
members by interpreting and weighing religious doctrine, but instead must use "neutral principles of law");
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602- 06 (1979) (reaffirming Presbyterian Church and articulating how "neu-
tral principles" are to be applied); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944) (a court, in accor-
dance with the first amendment, cannot decide if a believer's religious experiences are true or false).
60. 815 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1987).
61. Id. at 488-92.
62. Id. at 492 (quoting IOWA ADMIN. CODE 670.13.18 (1978)).
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Benton court said that "[a]n understanding of plaintiffs' religious beliefs and
practices is essential to the proper evaluation of plaintiffs' claims." 3 The court
then went on to-explain its understanding, saying:
We recognize the sincerity of plaintiffs' beliefs and the burden which they
believe the certification requirement imposes upon them. We agree with the
Supreme Court of Iowa, however, that plaintiffs' position is "'not altogether con-
sistent'" on this matter. Plaintiffs believe that licensure wrongfully interferes with
a teacher's calling by God to teach, yet they apparently do not object to the licen-
sure of those in their church called by God to other occupations, such as doctor
or lawyer, nor do they object to obtaining a driver's license for those serving
in their bus ministry .... '
At another point, the court noted:
Plaintiffs believe themselves to be "'in the world but not of the world,"' but
they do not segregate themselves from modern communities. They live in ordi-
nary residential neighborhoods and they interact with their neighbors and others
not of their faith. They believe they are called by God to perform certain occupa-
tions in life, but these include ordinary occupations such as nurse, lawyer, en-
gineer and accountant, and there is no evidence that they object to the licensing
of these occupations. 65
As the language indicates, the court did not really believe that the state require-
ment was a true burden on the plaintiffs' beliefs because of the plaintiffs' lack
of consistency in other areas.
Unfortunately, such an attitude overlooks one crucial and vital point: these
other mentioned areas might not be areas to which the plaintiffs subjectively
believe that their religion speaks, while education of their young is an area to
which their religion (at least in their perspective) speaks directly. That a be-
liever subjects himself to the state in areas where the state law does not conflict
with what he believes to be God's law does not indicate that the burden is any
less in the believer's mind for those areas where the believer does perceive a
conflict. In the case of Christian parents, many scriptures in the New Testa-
ment letters of Paul and Peter indicate that Christians have a general duty to
obey civil authorities. 66 If, however, a Christian feels that man's law conflicts
with God's law in a particular area, the Bible also supports the proposition that
God's law is supreme for the believer in that area. As an example, when the
Apostle Peter and others were tried for disobeying the Jewish authorities' in-
structions not to preach "in the name of Jesus," 6 7 they answered that "[w]e ought
63. Id. at 489. It is not completely clear from the opinion whether the Benton court was focusing exclu-
sively on the burden prong of the Yoder test, or whether the court's analysis also applied to evaluating the
sincerity of the objector's beliefs. Although the court purported to accept the sincerity of the belief, see id.
at 493, the court seemed to combine the two prongs at times.
64. Id. at 493 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted) (quoting Johnson v. Charles City Community Schools
Bd. of Educ., 368 N.W.2d 74, 78 (Iowa 1985)).
65. Id. at 489.
66. See, e.g., Romans 13:1-7; Titus 3:1; I Peter 2:13-14.
67. Acts 4:18.
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to obey God rather than men." 68 Moreover, Christ's instruction to "[riender
therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things
that are God's"16 9 clearly indicates that a Christian should distinguish between
different types of state requirements. According to the Benton court, however,
such distinctions can be used to discredit the validity of the believer's claim
against the state action.
b. Mozert v. Hawkins County
Another case in which a court used the objective burden standard to thwart
the plaintiffs' free exercise claim is the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals deci-
sion, Mozert v. Hawkins County. 7o In Mozert, the plaintiffs -fourteen parents
and seventeen children -claimed that they had sincere religious beliefs which
were contrary to the values taught or inculcated by the reading textbooks used
in the public school. The parents therefore wanted their children to be released
from the reading classes in order to receive alternative reading instruction. Ini-
tially the local school board agreed, but the state board of education subsequently
decided against allowing release time. 71 The plaintiffs then sought to hold the
defendants liable for "'forcing the student-plaintiffs to read school books which
teach or inculcate values in violation of their religious beliefs and convictions.' "72
At the trial court level, the federal district court found that there was a burden
on the plaintiffs' beliefs because their beliefs compelled them to refrain from
exposure to the reading textbooks. 73 The district court specifically rejected the
idea that in determining whether there was a burden it should decide if the plain-
tiffs' objections were central to their faith. 74 The court said that there was a
burden "despite the fact that many people holding more orthodox religious be-
liefs might find the plaintiffs' [beliefs] inconsistent, illogical, incomprehensi-
ble, and unacceptable."
75
Because the district court found a burden, it then examined the state's in-
terest and whether the state's means was the least restrictive way of furthering
the state's interest. The district court found that the state had a compelling state
interest in the literacy of its citizens, but that this interest could be accommo-
dated by the less restrictive means of allowing the students to opt out of the
68. Acts 5:29.
69. Matthew 22:23.
70. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1029 (1988).
71. Id. at 1059-61. For the trial court's statement of facts, see Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools,
647 F. Supp. 1194, 1196-97 (E.D. Tenn. 1986). The parents in Mozert were not seeking totally separate
private education for their children, so the fact situation is not exactly analogous to that of parents who are
doing so. Nevertheless, the parents were not seeking to change the public school curriculum for all students,
but rather only wanted to control the reading curriculum for their children. Also, for purposes of seeing
how courts analyze the burden prong of the Yoder test, the case is exactly on point.
72. Mozert v. Hawkins County, 827 F.2d at 1061.
73. Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools, 649 F. Supp. at 1198.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1198-99.
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
public school reading program and having the parents teach reading to their
children at home. 76 The children's reading proficiency would then be evaluated
by standardized achievement tests, and, if deficiencies were noted, the parents
and school officials could then "confer to facilitate improvement.""7
On appeal, however, the circuit court reversed without ever reaching the
questions of whether the state interest was compelling or whether the state in-
terest could be accomplished through a less restrictive means. 78 Instead the circuit
court held that there was no burden on the plaintiffs' religious beliefs because
the state action required only mere exposure.7 9 In the court's words:
Being exposed to other students performing these acts might be offensive
to the plaintiffs, but it does not constitute the compulsion described in the Supreme
Court cases, where the objector was required to affirm or deny a religious belief
or engage or refrain from engaging in a practice contrary to or required by their
sincerely held religious beliefs. 80
To support this position, the court went to great lengths to distinguish
Supreme Court decisions such as Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commis-
sion of Florida, Thomas v. Review Board, and Sherbert v. Verner, cases in which
the Supreme Court held that the denial of unemployment benefits to persons
who refused to work for religious reasons violated the first amendment free
exercise clause. 81 Moreover, the court said Yoder is distinguishable because
of the unique fact situation of the Amish and the impossibility of reconciling
the goals of public education with the Amish religion which requires parents
to prepare their children for a separate way of life. 82
Upon examination, however, the court's distinctions do not stand up. In
the employment decisions, the potential loss to the plaintiff if he followed his
religious belief and declined a job was only money, surely a less significant
burden than years of compulsory education and value inculcation during the
formative years of a child's life .8 3 Moreover, it was exposure that the Supreme
Court in Yoder said would likely destroy the Amish way of life. 84 There is
no indication in Yoder that the state compulsory law or the state authorities re-
quired the Amish children (in the words of the Mozert court) "to affirm or deny
a religious belief." "Mere exposure" in and of itself presented a sufficient bur-
den to warrant first amendment protection.
76. Id. at 1202-03.
77. Id. at 1203.
78. Mozert v. Hawkins County, 827 F.2d at 1070.
79. Id. at 1063-68.
80. Id. at 1066.
81. Id. at 1065. (The mentioned Supreme Court cases are cited therein.)
82. Id. at 1067.
83. See id. at 1079 (Boggs, J., concurring).
84. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-19 (1972).
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These two cases - Benton and Mozert - point out the inherent difficulty of
objectively evaluating whether there is a burden on a believer's asserted reli-
gious belief. More significantly, the cases show how an objective burden stan-
dard allows courts to eviscerate the protection contemplated by strict scrutiny.
By evaluating the burden with an objective standard, courts can effectively say
that the believer's distinctions are not the ones that count, and then the court
need not reach the question of whether the government's interest is compelling
or whether the government action is the least intrusive means of accomplishing
the state interest.
3. The State's Compelling Interests
"Education" undoubtedly is an important interest of the state. "Education,"
however, is an undefined term which means different things to different peo-
ple. To really understand the state's interest in education, it is necessary to pin-
point exactly what the state is trying to accomplish through education that can
be considered a compelling state interest.
The Supreme Court has recognized two interests or concerns which the
state has in education: preparing children to be self-reliant and competent




The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the state has a legitimate con-
cern in ensuring that children receive enough education so they will be produc-
tive, or at least self-reliant, citizens in society.87 This concern seems reasonable,
especially since the state now provides a societal safety net for those persons
who cannot provide for themselves. If the state is going to bear the responsibil-
ity for those who need help, then surely the state has an interest in ensuring
that as few people as possible fall into this category. The relevant question is
how far this interest extends.
For the children of parents who do not agree with conventional societal
wisdom as to what type of lifestyle their children should be prepared for, the
Supreme Court has said that this concern of the state is limited. In Wisconsin
v. Yoder, the Amish wanted to prepare their children to continue the Amish
tradition of agrarian, rural existence, a lifestyle very different from that of the
rest of society. 88 Because there was no evidence that the minority (the Amish)
85. See id. at 221-22.
86. See Bethel School Dist. v. Frazer, 478 U.S. 675, 681-84 (1986); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 864 (1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979).
87. See supra note 84.
88. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221-28.
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was wrong and that the majority (the school officials) was right about which
type of lifestyle and work the children should be prepared for, the Court right-
ly would not assume that the state was correct in its assertions. 89
The Supreme Court decision of San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez90 provides further evidence of how this state interest in educa-
tion is limited. In Rodriguez, the Court held that education was not a fundamental
right protected by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and
thus Texas was not required to provide equal funding to all school districts within
the state. 91 The poorest school district in Texas at the time spent only $356
per pupil while the wealthiest district spent $594, a difference of
69% .92 Nevertheless, the Court said: "[The lack] of personal resources has not
occasioned an absolute deprivation of the desired benefit [i.e., education]. The
argument here is not that the children are receiving no public education; rather,
it is that they are receiving a poorer quality education than children in districts
having more assessable wealth."
9 3
The Court then said at a later point in the opinion:
Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection
under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is im-
plicitly protected ....
Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is a
constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either right
[the right to speak or to vote intelligently and effectively], we have no indication
that the present ... system fails to provide each child with an opportunity to
acquire the basic minimal skills [necessary].
We have carefully considered each of the arguments supportive of the Dis-
trict Court's finding that education is a fundamental right or liberty and have found
those arguments unpersuasive. 94
Admittedly, Rodriguez dealt with whether the state had the affirmative duty
to provide equal education as a fundamental right under the equal protection
clause rather than whether the state could decide to treat its interest in educa-
tion as a compelling concern. A negative answer to the former does not neces-
sarily foreclose a positive answer to the latter, at least when it comes to the
amount of emphasis the state gives to public education in its budget policy goals.
However, "'[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interest,"' will
justify an interest as compelling. 95 That a state does not have to provide roughly
89. Id. at 223-24.
90. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
91. Id. at 29-39.
92. Id. at 12-13.
93. Id. at 23.
94. Id. at 36-37.
95. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530
(1945)).
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equal levels of educational support to all children certainly weakens any claim
by the state that parents do not have the right to provide a different type of
basic education for their children. As long as the parents do not completely
deprive their children of basic education skills, then the parents are doing as
much as the Supreme Court is willing to require of the state itself.96 Given
the limited nature of the state's interest in basic education, it is hard to justify
extensive regulation of private education unless some other compelling interest
is shown. 9'
b. The Inculcation of Values
According to the Supreme Court, a second concern the state has in educa-
tion is the inculcation of values necessary for democracy. 98 Unlike the first
interest-the development of basic skills to be a self-reliant and competent
citizen-the strength of this state interest is not so obvious, especially in the
case of children of parents who choose the private education alternative.
At the outset, one has to question exactly which values are necessary for
the maintenance of democracy. In a thoughtful article, Kenneth A. Strike of
Cornell University says that there are two general views of what constitutes
democratic values in the education context: the "conventional" view and the
"censor's" view. With the former, the "marketplace of ideas" is the central value.
Any inquiry should include alternative viewpoints, criticism, and debate. "No
idea is sacrosanct, no theory beyond challenge. Ideas must prove their worth
by being tested in the crucible of debate." Autonomy, personal growth, and
the freedom of the students take precedence over the values of the community
and the parents. Children are assumed to be adult, rational actors, and educa-
tors are the protectors of the free intellectual environment necessary for de-
velopment. Parents who want to structure their child's moral development to
conform to their own value system are trying to impose a "narrow vision" which
will harm the child's growth and development. 99
96. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36-37.
97. In fact, a major study conducted by James Coleman, Thomas Hoffer, and Sally Kilgore concludes
that private schools are better than public schools in providing students basic educational skills, even when
selection criteria such as family background factors are controlled. See J. COLEMAN, T. HOFFER & S. KILGORE,
HIGH SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT: PUBLIC, CATHOLIC, AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS COMPARED (1982). Although not
universally accepted, the study does suggest that private schools further rather than thwart the state's interest
in providing sufficient basic skills so that a child will grow up to be a self-reliant and competent citizen.
For several critiques of the Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore study and responses by the study authors, see
58 Soc. OF EDUC. (1985) and 51 HARV. EDuc. REV. (1981).
The Coleman, Hoffer, Kilgore study was based on standardized achievement test scores. For an evalua-
tion of the study using Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) results, see Bickel & Chang, Public Schools, Private
Schools, and the Common School Idea, 17 URBAN REV. 85-97 (1985) (concluding that there are no apprecia-
ble differences between public and private schools).
98. See supra note 86.
99. Strike, A Field Guide of Censors: Toward a Concept of Censorship in Public Schools, 87 TCHRs.
C. REC. 239, 240-42 (1985).
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The censor's view that Strike postulates is just as developed as the conven-
tional view, but there the similarity ends. With the "censor's" view, pluralism
does not mean the "vigorous discussion between people with opposing views,"
but rather the "existence of separate autonomous communities whose members
are free to pursue their own values and to transmit them to their children without
opposition." Different groups and parents have the right to maintain their group
and its culture, which may mean isolation from the mainstream of society. The
central idea is freedom of conscience, not a marketplace of ideas. Children are
immature students, and the curriculum of the schools is a "set of choices about
what is educationally worthwhile." Teacher claims of autonomy are really a
subterfuge for the real conflict between two groups-the educators and the
parents -about what is educationally valuable. "It is the truth that makes men
free, not diversity." The real values necessary for democracy are respect for
different groups who believe in different forms of the "truth. '1°°
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the meaning of the phrase "values
essential for democracy" is not self-defining, and as a result even Supreme Court
decisions are inconsistent on the power of school authorities to override first
amendment concerns in order to inculcate values. 101 Undoubtedly, either of
the opposing views articulated by Strife could be developed and refined by a
school board as their articulation of the values essential for democracy, but the
type of school system that would result from each respective view would be
substantially different. Since it is so difficult to articulate what values are es-
sential, the state's interest in furthering these values is not as compelling as it
may have first appeared.
As a further example of the problems associated with the concept of values
"essential" to democracy, consider the Mozert v. Hawkins County case discussed
earlier. 102 In Mozert the court said that critical reading, to which the plaintiffs
objected on religious grounds, furthered the values of tolerance of divergent
political and religious views and the consideration of the sensibilities of others -
values which the court, citing Supreme Court decisions, 1 0 3 deemed essential
to democracy. 1 04 Though the court declined to reach the question of the state's
interest, it nevertheless, in dicta, characterized critical reading as a compelling
100. Id. at 242-44; see also supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
101. Cf. Bethel School Dist. v. Frazer, 478 U.S. at 681 ("fundamental values" necessary for democracy,
as relating to expressing unpopular and controversial views in schools, must take into account the sensibili-
ties of others, and thus school officials can ban lewd language); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506-14 (1969) (school officials cannot ban students from wearing armbands
to show opposition to the Vietnam War merely to avoid the controversy that accompanies an unpopular view-
point, but the student action must threaten to substantially disrupt the work of the school or impinge upon
the rights of other students before school officials can take regulatory action).
102. See supra part III.B.2.b.
103. The Supreme Court decisions the Mozert court cited for this proposition are Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981), neither of which dealt with education.
104. See Mozert v. Hawkins County, 827 F.2d at 1068-69.
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state interest. 105 In concurrence, however, Judge Boggs aptly pointed out that
the state conceded that critical reading was not really definable and could not
be evaluated. In Judge Boggs' words: "It seems . . . to be extremely difficult,
not to say unfair, to rest a compelling state interest on the asserted failure of
plaintiffs to learn something which defendants are apparently unable to define
and unwilling to test for." 10
Contributing to this definition problem is the broad approval authority that
local education officials have under vague state statutes; the "essential" values
can sometimes be the school superintendent's personal values. In fact, the most
successful attack on state approval statutes thus far by parents attempting to
teach their children at home is a "void for vagueness" argument, but even when
the statute is not found constitutionally vague, the power to approve or dis-
approve often varies widely from school district to school district. "07
In sum, the state's interest in inculcating values does not seem as compel-
ling as the Supreme Court or education officials would have one believe. The
Court has not specifically identified the values in which the state has a compel-
ling interest beyond the generality of those values which are "essential to democra-
cy." As shown, this phrase is so broad that it is essentially meaningless.
So far, the examination of the state's concern in inculcating values has con-
centrated on whether the state has articulated and defined the values it seeks
to inculcate. The unspoken assumption has been that the state legitimately can
deem the inculcating of certain values a compelling concern as long as those
values are identifiable.
On a more fundamental level, however, this whole premise of the state
inculcating values through the school system seems inconsistent with the first
amendment. Freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of association,
freedom of the press, and the right to petition government all implicate the right
to think freely as individuals rather than as people inculcated with values which
the state views as important. When government, fortified with compulsory at-
tendance laws, seeks to inculcate values, there is bound to be tension with the
first amendment. In the area of religious freedom or freedom of conscience,
this is particularly true. Although religion in its broadest sense can be consi-
105. Id. at 1070-71.
106. Id. at 1077 (Boggs, J., concurring).
107. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
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dered a world view, 108 fundamentalist Christian parents seem to be especially
sensitive to conflict between the inculcating function of the state and the incul-
cating function of their particular view of Christianity. Writings of religious
philosophers and lawyers have raised this awareness to an even higher level
in recent years. 109
Given this tension, an extreme but logical position can be taken that state
inculcation of values through schools is unconstitutional. As the argument goes,
public education was not part of American life when the Constitution was writ-
ten, and as a result the framers had no occasion specifically to address the state's
role in this area. A principle that comes through loudly and clearly, however,
is that the framers wanted to protect the autonomy of individuals to form opin-
ions, to express themselves, and generally to think in a manner largely unfet-
tered by state control. Applying this principle to the state's value inculcation
interest in education, one could (should?) conclude that our modern public edu-
cation system, as presently structured, is unconstitutional because value incul-
cation is not a proper role for the state under the first amendment. 110
Using just such a method, one commentator, Stephen Arons, has argued
that there is a "core principle or central meaning" to the first amendment
108. As one commentator, M. Scott Peck, M.D., observes in his best-selling book, THE ROAD LESS
TRAVELED:
As human beings grow in discipline and love and life experience, their understanding of the world
and their place in it naturally grows apace. Conversely, as people fail to grow in discipline, love,
and life experience, so does their understanding fail to grow. Consequently, among the members
of the human race there exists an extraordinary variability in the breadth and sophistication of our
understanding of what life is all about.
This understanding is our religion. Since everyone has some understanding -some world view,
no matter how limited or primitive or inaccurate- everyone has a religion. This fact, not widely recog-
nized, is of the utmost importance: everyone has a religion. We suffer, I believe, from a tendency
to define religion too narrowly ....
M. PECK, THE ROAD LEss TRAVELED 186 (1978) (emphasis added). See generally id. at 186-232.
109. See, e.g., F. SCHAEFFER, A CHRISTIAN MANIFESTO (1982); F. SCHAEFFER, THE GREAT EVANGELI-
CAL DISASTER (1984); J. WHITEHEAD, THE STEALING OF AMERICA (1983).
110. A strong advocate of such a functional approach to constitutional construction is Justice Brennan,
who articulated the position well in School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963),
a case concerning the public school setting. Schempp held that the first amendment establishment clause
prohibited Bible readings or organized prayer in the public school classroom. In his concurring opinion,
Justice Brennan wrote:
Whatever Jefferson or Madison would have thought of Bible reading or the recital of the Lord's
Prayer in what few public schools existed in their day, our use of history of their time must limit
itself to broad purposes, not specific practices. By such standard, I am persuaded, as the Court, that
the devotional exercises ... offend the First Amendment because they sufficiently threaten in our
day those substantive evils the fear of which called forth the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.
Id. at 241 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Moreover, the Supreme Court has used such a method of construction to develop what are now consi-
dered mainstays of constitutional jurisprudence. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), for ex-
ample, the Court, using similar logic, recognized the right of privacy for married people and thus struck
down a state restriction on the use of contraceptives. In Justice Douglas' words:
The association of people is not mentioned in the Constitution nor in the Bill of Rights. The
right to educate a child in a school of the parent's choice-whether public or private or parochial -is
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that,"1  when applied to public schools, mandates a major restructuring to in-
clude revised thinking on financing, 1 2 equal protection, 11 3 and regulation of
private schools. "4
Arons concentrates on the first amendment free speech clause, but there
is just as much logical support under the free exercise clause of the first amend-
ment. Both the free exercise clause and the establishment clause emanated from
a system where the state church established orthodoxy. As another commenta-
tor has pointed out, the clauses thus should be construed together as "function-
ally interdependent" with the free exercise clause protecting the individual's
religious identity and the establishment clause ensuring that the social institu-
tions of the state do not infringe upon this identity. 115More generally, the central
value of the clauses is to protect the right to develop and nurture nonmajoritari-
an religious belief. 116
Today there is no organized state church in the same formal sense as there
was in early America. This is not to say, however, that the same evil the framers
saw in the state church cannot manifest itself through some other state institu-
tion. The public school system, with its value-inculcating role, backed up with
compulsory education laws that (as applied) allow for extensive regulation of
private education is such an institution. In essence, "[t]he school has become
the established church of secular times."
117
To call public schools the church of the modern state is a strong statement,
but the similarities between the function of the church in early America and
also not mentioned. Nor is the right to study any particular subject or any foreign language. Yet
the First Amendment has been construed to include certain of those rights .... The right of free-
dom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute,
the right to receive, the right to read and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought and freedom to
teach -indeed the freedom of the entire university community. Without those peripheral rights the
specific rights would be less secure.
Id. at 482-83.
111. Arons, The Separation of School and State: Pierce Reconsidered, 46 HARV. EDUC. REV. 76, 91-92
(1976).
112. Arons, supra note Ill, at 100.
113. Id. at 101.
114. Id. at 103.
115. See Note, Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1638-39 (1987).
Admittedly, there is not unanimity on this point. Historical evidence also suggests that the religion clauses
had two separate purposes. According to this evidence, the free exercise clause protected individual freedom
of conscience from federal interference, while the establishment clause protected states' rights to maintain
state churches. In other words, free exercise was to be an individual's right vis a vis the federal government,
while non-establishment was to be a states' right, or federalism issue. See DREISBACH, REAL THREAT OR
MERE SHADOW: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 89-96 (1987). With the passage of the
fourteenth amendment and the development of the incorporation doctrine, however, the utility of such an
approach today is questionable at best.
116. See id.; New Life Baptist Church Academy v. Town of East Longmeadow, 666 F. Supp. 293, 313
(D. Mass. 1987).
117. Arons, supra note 111, at 104 (quoting Illich, Commencement at the University of Puerto Rico, NEW
YORK REV. OF BOOKS, Oct. 9, 1969, at 12).
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the value-inculcating function of modern public education is also very strong.
In the Massachusetts Bay Colony, for instance, church membership, and thus
belief, was not required, but church attendance was mandatory. The justifica-
tion was based on a distinction between the external and internal. The civil magis-
trate, in accordance with the law of the land, could compel Sunday worship
(i.e., remember the Sabbath and keep it holy); but no one could actually be
forced to internalize the faith. "1 Likewise, the whole population, whether be-
lievers or not, paid taxes to support the parish and the minister. 119
The justification used for the attendance requirement is expressed well in
a letter written by John Cotton defending the New England system:
You think to compel men in matter of worship to make men sin .... If the wor-
ship be lawful in itself, the magistrate compelling him to come to it compelleth
him not to sin, but the sin is in his will that needs to be compelled to a Christian
duty.
... But (say you) it doth but make even hypocrites, to compel men to con-
form the outward man for fear of punishment. If it did so, yet better to be hypo-
crites than prophane [sic] persons. Hypocrites give God part of his due[,] the
outward man, but the prophane [sic] person giveth God neither outward nor in-
ward man. 
120
Cotton's language is very similar to that of the Mozert decision discussed
in Part III.B.2.b. In Mozert, the court held that the school district did not have
to release students from reading classes that the parents objected to on religious
grounds because mere exposure did not constitute a burden on religion. To justify
its position, the court said:
If the Hawkins County schools had required the plaintiff students either to be-
lieve or say they believe that "all religions are merely different roads to God,"
this would be a different case. No instrument of government can, consistent with
the Free Exercise Clause, require such a belief or affirmation. However, there
was absolutely no showing that the defendant school board sought to do this; ....
... Mrs. Frost did testify that she did not want her children to make critical
judgments and exercise choices in areas where the Bible provides the an-
swer .... It was a goal of the school system to encourage this exercise, but
nowhere was it shown that it was required .... The only conduct compelled
by the defendants was reading and discussing the material in the Holt series, and
hearing other students' interpretations of those materials. This is the exposure
118. See Liberties of Massachusetts (1641), in A COLLECTION OF ORIGINAL PAPERS RELATIVE TO THE
HISTORY OF THE COLONY OF MASSACHUSETTS-BAY (T. Hutchinson ed. 1769); The Cambridge Platform Chapter
XVII (1648), in W. WALKER, THE CREEDS AND PLATFORMS OF CONGREGATIONALISM 194, 227-29 (1893).
119. See An Act for the Settlement and Support of Ministers and Schoolmasters, chs. 26, 28, 46 (1692),
in I ACTS AND RESOLVES OF THE PROVIDENCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY (BOSTON 1869); see also Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780, art. III (available in MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN., Constitution, app. to § 4 (1979)).
120. Copy of John Cotton's answer to a Letter of Sir Richard Saltonstall, in A COLLECTION OF ORIGINAL
PAPERS RELATIVE TO HISTORY OF THE COLONY OF MASSACHUSETTS-BAY 404-05 (T. Hutchinson ed. 1769).
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to which the plaintiffs objected. What is absent from this case is the critical ele-
ment of compulsion to affirm or deny a religious belief . 121
Just as Cotton did not consider exposure to ideas alone to be a burden on a
person's freedom of conscience, neither did the Mozert court. The difference,
of course, is that the first amendment did not exist at the time of Cotton's letter.
The practice of requiring persons to pay taxes in support of the church is
another example that shows the similarities between the early American church
and the modem school situation. The similarity is illustrated well in the early
Massachusetts case of Barnes v. The Inhabitants of the First Parish of
Falmouth. 122 In Barnes the plaintiff was a religious teacher, but his followers
were not of the Massachusetts orthodox church or of an incorporated religious
society. Under the Massachusetts constitution at the time, public teachers of
"piety, religion and morality" could receive payment from the state. 123 The court,
however, held that this applied only to teachers of incorporated (i.e., state ap-
proved) religious societies and thus the plaintiff was not entitled to the public
money that the people of his sect paid to the government to support religion. 
124
As justification for its holding, the court went to great lengths to describe
why Christianity provided a value system important to society. According to
the court, Christianity tends "to make every man . . . a better husband, par-
ent, child, neighbor, citizen, and magistrate." 125 Moreover, Christian values
supplement the criminal law and thus are vital to society because "[h]uman laws
cannot oblige to the performance of the duties of imperfect obliga-
tion . . . . These are moral duties, flowing from the disposition of the heart,
and not subject to the control of human legislation." 126 Using this justification,
the court reasoned that the state was justified in supporting orthodox Chris-
tianity and closely regulating the support of alternative forms of religion be-
cause the values the church inculcated were essential to society.
Certainly such a decision in relation to a state church could not be upheld
today since the fourteenth amendment makes the first amendment applicable
to the states. 127 The question remains, however, as to what evil the first amend-
ment is directed in order to preclude the Barnes outcome today. Is it only the
technical fact that the state was sponsoring a state church, or is it also the more
fundamental evil of the state inculcating values? If the latter, it is but a small
step to reach the conclusion that state inculcation of values through schools also
violates the first amendment. At a minimum, it is clear that the state's interest
in inculcating values should be limited to public schools in order to ensure that
121. Mozert v. Hawkins County, 827 F.2d at 1069.
122. 6 Mass. 401 (1810).
123. Id. at 404.
124. Id. at 412-17.
125. Id. at 406.
126. Id. at 405.
127. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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parents who disagree with the values of the public schools have an escape to
private education that is one of substance and not one of form only. Moreover,
this escape needs to be relatively unfettered by state officials. Therefore, a re-
vised standard for evaluating free exercise challenges to regulation of private
education is needed.
IV. A REVISED FREE EXERCISE STANDARD AND A SUGGESTED MEANS
As detailed in Part III, the free exercise standard of Yoder and Hobbie does
not provide sufficient freedom from state regulation for parents who want to
educate their children in a private education program. The objective burden
standard can be used to evade the protection contemplated by strict scrutiny,
and the "values essential to democracy" that the state seeks to inculcate through
education is ill-defined. Even if the values could be defined, however, extend-
ing this interest to private education is contrary to the principle of protecting
nonmajoritarian beliefs which underlies the first amendment. Therefore, it is
vital that parents have a more effective escape for their children from the value
inculcation of the public schools than currently exists.
Because of these problems, a revised free exercise test is needed, and this
article suggests that the revised test be based on the principles articulated in
other areas of the first amendment such as the free speech clause. One com-
mentator has noted that the free exercise clause jurisprudence is awash with
confusion because of a lack of substantive content. 128 In the area of free speech,
however, the Supreme Court has provided guidance by establishing presump-
tions which clearly delineate the favored party, depending on the parties in-
volved and the nature of the disputed activity. Free speech conflicts are still
difficult, but such legal principles as the "clear and present danger"
standard1 29 and the restrictions on prior restraints 130 protect nonmajoritarian
opinion to a far greater measure than the compromise of Pierce, the balancing
of Yoder, or the strict scrutiny of Hobbie. The same measure of protection is
now needed under the free exercise clause in private education claims because,
as previously discussed, there is a close nexus between education and belief
formation which in turn gives rise to a close relationship between the free exer-
cise clause and the free speech clause.
128. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of the Constitution,
72 CAL. L. REV. 847, 847-49 (1984).
129. See infra notes 132-33, 138 and accompanying text.
130. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 9:101
1988] STATE REGULATION OF PRIVATE RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 127
A. The Relationship Between the Free Speech Clause
and the Free Exercise Clause
The free speech clause of the first amendment and the free exercise clause
are related in many ways. As previously mentioned in Part III, the free exer-
cise clause is directed at the right of individuals to develop and nurture non-
majoritarian beliefs, 1 31 and the same is true for the free speech clause. If the
only speech or belief protected by the free speech clause or the free exercise
clause was that which conformed with the majority, there would not be any
need for the clauses.
To have true freedom of speech, there must be freedom of thought, or at
least the freedom to develop thought freely if one chooses. The right to speak
is largely meaningless if the state restricts the beliefs, or values, upon which
speech is based to those values that the state considers proper. Values do not
develop in a vacuum but instead stem from some philosophical source, be it
theistic revelation or humanistic reasoning. Because of this close link between
speech, values, and philosophy, suppression of one also affects the other two.
Suppression of speech that inhibits advocacy and discourse on a particular set
of values also indirectly inhibits the philosophy underlying the given values.
With speech predicated on humanistic philosophies, the free speech clause
itself provides protection, even when the speech involves radical advocacy of
illegal action. Unless the speech "is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action," the speech is pro-
tected. 132 More succinctly, the speech must present a "clear and present danger"
to a legitimate state interest. 133 When the underlying philosophy is clearly
"religion," one would think that at least the same (and possibly even extra pro-
tection) would be provided because of the joint protection of the free speech
clause and the free exercise clause. As previously explained, such has not been
the normal case in the education setting when the analysis focuses solely upon
the free exercise clause and its current jurisprudence.
Occasionally however, the Supreme Court has recognized the link between
the two clauses and has thus conducted a broader analysis than that of the cur-
rent free exercise test. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Bar-
nette, 134 for example, a group of Jehovah's Witnesses objected to a Board of
Education resolution requiring all teachers and students to salute the flag as
a regular part of the public school activities. Failure to participate would "'be
regarded as an Act of insubordination,"' for which the child could be expelled,
be classified as "'unlawfully absent,"' and "be proceeded against as a delin-
quent." Parents of the child could be criminally prosecuted. 135 The Jehovah's
131. See supra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
132. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
133. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 505 (1951).
134. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
135. Id. at 626.
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Witnesses objected to the resolution based on a literal interpretation of Exodus
20:4-5, which says: "'Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any
likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath,
or that is in the water under the earth; thou shalt not bow down thyself to them,
nor serve them.' "13
6
The Jehovah's Witnesses' objection was religiously based (as the Court ac-
knowledged), 31 and therefore the Court could have focused exclusively on the
free exercise clause of the first amendment. Instead, the Court took a broader
perspective, saying:
It is now a commonplace that censorship or suppression of expression of opinion
is tolerated by our Constitution only when the expression presents a clear and
present danger of action of a kind the State is empowered to prevent and pun-
ish .... But here the power of compulsion is invoked without any allegation
that remaining passive during a flag salute ritual creates a clear and present danger
that would justify an effort even to muffle expression. To sustain the compulsory
flag salute we are required to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the individu-
al's right to speak his own mind, left it open to public authorities to compel him
to utter what is not in his mind. 131
Such is also the message of the more recent Supreme Court decision, Wooley
v. Maynard, 139 in which the Court struck down a New Hampshire statute re-
quiring residents to display car license plates embossed with the expression "Live
Free or Die," the state motto of New Hampshire. 140 Again, the objectors were
Jehovah's Witnesses, and the philosophy underlying their objection was their
religious belief. In the words of the plaintiff objector:
"By religious training and belief, I believe my 'government'-Jehovah's
Kingdom-offers everlasting life. It would be contrary to that belief to give up
my life for the state, even if it meant living in bondage. Although I obey all laws
of the State not in conflict with my conscience, this slogan is directly at odds
with my deeply held religious convictions."
41
Under the current free exercise test, the Court easily could have ruled that dis-
playing a sign did not require a person to give up his life for the state and thus
there is no conflict or burden on the person's belief. Instead, the Court again
used free speech principles to invalidate the statute. 142
Yet another case where the Supreme Court chose to use a free speech anal-
ysis rather than a free exercise analysis is Widmar v. Vincent. 143 In Widmar,
136. Id. at 629.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 633-34 (emphasis added).
139, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
140. Id. at 707.
141. Id. at 707 n.2.
142. Id. at 717.
143. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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a registered student religious group objected to a university regulation that pro-
hibited the use of university buildings or grounds "'for purposes of religious
worship or religious teachings.'"1*4 The Court did not undertake to judge whether
the students' belief was sincere or whether there was a burden on the belief.
Instead, the Court used a straightforward free speech test, saying "[o]ur cases
have required the most exacting scrutiny in cases in which a state undertakes
to regulate speech on the basis of its content . . . . In this constitutional con-
text, we are unable to recognize the State's interest as sufficiently compelling
to justify content-based discrimination against respondent's religious speech."145
The clear import of these decisions is that the values protected by the free
exercise clause and the free speech clause are closely related. Therefore, the
legal standard used for the two should also be closely related.
B. The Contours of a Consistent Free Exercise Test for Religious-
Based Objections to State Regulation of Private Education
1. Sincerity of Belief and Burdens on Belief
For the reasons explained in Part III. B. 1. and 2., a court, when analyzing
a free exercise claim of parents who desire private education for their children
for religious reasons, should presume the sincerity of the believer's belief and
the validity of the burden which the believer claims the state action imposed
upon the belief. This presumption will serve to stop courts from purporting to
understand a person's religion better than the person himself, and, more im-
portantly, the presumption will require the courts to scrutinize the concerns of
the state in all cases.
2. The Concerns of the State
Another major premise of the free speech decisions is that the danger the
state alleges must not be abstract doctrine but rather must be a truly identifi-
able, tangible threat. 146 Likewise, anyconcern the state has in regulating pri-
vate education should be tangible and definable before the state can use an interest
to override parental choice.
As previously explained, the phrase "values essential to democracy" has
144. Id. at 265.
145. Id. at 276.
146. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1968) (to be unlawful, advocacy of illegal action
must be "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action"); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1960) (to be illegal, advocacy of illegal action must
be reasonably calculated to incite such action rather than advocacy of mere doctrine); Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298, 316, 321-22 (1956) (criminal prosecution for advocacy of abstract doctrine not constitutional
under the free speech clause).
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not been defined; and even if the phrase were definable, compulsory inculca-
tion of such values in private education runs contrary to the spirit and purpose
of the first amendment. 14 7 Thus, the state's concern in regulating private edu-
cation definitely should not include this function.
The other concern of the state which the Supreme Court has recognized
(i.e., ensuring children receive minimal basic skills to be self-reliant and com-
petent citizens) is legitimate if narrowly defined. 148 For the concern to be com-
pelling enough to extend to private education, however, it must be defined and
limited so that it does not develop into value inculcation. Moreover, it would
be unfair to hold the parent to a higher standard than the courts are willing to
hold the state.
There is another principle from the Supreme Court's free speech decisions
that provides guidance on the limits of the state's concern in ensuring children
receive basic educational skills. Under free speech jurisprudence, the state can
impose restraints before the fact only in the most limited circumstances. With
the press, for example, the possibilities of abuse are so great when restraints
prior to the fact are imposed that they are very rarely justified. 149 A similar
policy of restraint is also necessary in the case of parents who want to educate
their children in a private system of education. Any action by the state should
be taken after the fact to the extent possible.
Applying this latter principle to regulation of private education, it must be
remembered that education of a child is a long-term enterprise, extending over
thirteen years from kindergarten through high school graduation. To use a com-
pletely after-the-fact approach that measures the skills necessary to be self-reliant,
competent citizens at high school graduation would be too late to correct any
deficiencies that arise. However, state action that attempts to further the state
interest prior to the inception of private education programs presents the same
potential abuses that exist under the current legal structure. Therefore, some
intermediate monitoring process must be devised that looks at the children's
progress on a regular basis but yet is not overly intrusive on the parental rights
to structure their child's education.
3. Possible Means of State Regulation
One possible means that complies with the spirit of the above-mentioned
principles is standardized testing on an annual basis. The federal district court
of Massachusetts, after detailed inquiry into the efficacy of available tests, re-
cently held that such testing met the state's interest in ensuring that basic skills
147. See supra notes 98-107 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
149. See New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (The Pentagon Papers); Near v. Min-
nesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931).
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were taught and at the same time protected the parents' free exercise right to
be free from intrusive intervention by the state in the practice of their
faith. 150 Because the tests can be given on an annual basis, neither the child's
welfare nor the state's interests are irrevocably impaired.
If the tests do indicate a problem, then more intrusive follow-up measures
by the state might be warranted. Before the state intervenes in the private edu-
cation system, however, the deficiency must be connected within a problem
in the teaching system rather than some other factor such as a child's intellectu-
al ability. Moreover, identification of a problem still does not mean that the
state should take control of the child's education. Many other alternatives such
as private tutorials and computer-based teaching techniques are also available.
Just as a public school should be given a chance to correct identified problems,
so should a private education program.
Testing alone may not be an acceptable means of measurement for all chil-
dren. Some children, although their learning level is actually adequate, may
not do well on standardized tests. This is especially true when the test has not
been validated properly by race or ethnic background. For these children, differ-
ent approaches will be necessary. Full inquiry into this area is beyond the scope
of this article, but suffice it to say that where there is a will, there is usually
a way. Development of alternative, unintrusive measurements for unusual chil-
dren is not beyond the scope of interested parents and educators.
C. Possible Objections
One possible objection to a measurement means such as testing is that it
would place too much of an administrative burden on the state, especially if
a child does poorly on an evaluation and the public school officials must follow
up with more individualized methods. This objection is not persuasive, however,
when one considers that the state is not the only responsible party available
to supply education services. The tests and follow-up could be administered
by the parent or by an independent third party. In fact, many parents prefer
third parties because they want to be as independent from the public school
system as possible. 151 Regardless if the measure is standardized testing or a
more particularized process such as oral interviews, public education officials
need not be the supplier of the necessary financial or professional resources.
As long as there is reasonable assurance that the measurement is a reasonably
accurate measurement of the child's education level and that the test is conduct-
ed fairly, the state education authorities should be satisfied.
150. New Life Baptist Church Academy v. Town of East Longmeadow, 666 F. Supp. 293, 306-08, 319-22
(D. Mass. 1987).
151. Interview with Paul Dillon, Attorney at Law, in Dillon's office in Falmouth, MA (Jan. 29, 1988).
Mr. Dillon has handled several legal cases for parents who want to home school their children.
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Moreover, there is really no reason to assume there would be a greater
administrative burden than the state currently bears even if the state conducted
the testing itself. Because the state approval process is currently much more
ad hoc in nature and considers the methods of private education programs, the
evaluation process is by nature much less objective than is a method that evalu-
ates the output of an education program. To determine if a parent or a third
party is a competent teacher, as is required in Massachusetts, for example, might
take considerable expertise, time, and effort. Testing, however, looks only to
measurable results and thus is a much more distinct standard. The number of
disagreements and the accompanying resources needed to resolve the disagree-
ments should decrease, thus freeing up these resources for other purposes. If
administrative costs are to be considered, it is only fair to consider the adminis-
trative efficiencies that may also accrue. An a priori assumption that the over-
all administrative burden will increase with testing does not seem warranted.
Even if testing would place a greater administrative burden on state offi-
cials, however, this burden still would not justify the denial of parental rights.
Compulsory education and the furtherance of the state's concern of self-reliant
citizens are goals which the state has chosen to undertake. This choice by the
state, though, does not weaken the first amendment rights of parents. If ad-
ministrative effort is necessary to satisfy the state's concern but yet not infringe
on religious liberty, then so be it. The effort is worth it.
Another possible objection to the revised standard is that there is no effec-
tive check on extremist parents. An example might be Ku Klux Klan parents
who teach white supremacy as a tenet of their religious beliefs. These situa-
tions probably will occur, but it is also true that they will probably be relatively
rare, and the unique situation should not be the cause for denying the choice
of other parents. Just as the failure of some public schools to meet the needs
of children is not grounds to invalidate the concept of public education in general,
neither should the unique parent be cause to deny choice to all other par-
ents. 152 Moreover, the state is not totally powerless in these type situations be-
cause the state can legitimately ensure that the child receives the basic skills
to be a self-reliant and competent citizen and such skills will help provide the
foundation upon which a child can develop his own world view as he or she
matures.
It is also important to recognize that there are many other constraints on
parental choice. Parents are aware that their children must receive a credible
education according to the standards of mainstream colleges and universities
if the children are to receive post-secondary higher education in such an insti-
tution. For students who go right into the work force after leaving school, em-
ployers will insist that the potential employee have the educational skills necessary
152. Cf. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (saying that the statist notion that the neglect of some
parents justifies state intervention in all cases is "repugnant to American tradition").
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to perform the given job. To assume that most parents will completely ignore
such realities in structuring their child's education is not warranted.
Finally, it is a truism that freedom does not come without a price, and some-
times the price is less expediency and the toleration of doctrine and actions which
are totally foreign and alien to everything "American." In other areas of first
amendment concern, the Supreme Court has said that freedom is worth this
price. Such is also the case with state regulation of private education.
V. CONCLUSION
The current legal strife between state educators and parents, who because
of religious conviction want to educate their children in a system different from
that provided by the state, is really a struggle for control over influence of the
children's minds. The state does have a limited interest in ensuring that chil-
dren receive the basic skills to be self-reliant, competent citizens; but the vast
majority of the educational responsibility must be vested in the parents, at least
to the extent that parents are willing to accept the responsibility. This vesting
is necessary in order to preserve both parental religious liberty and free speech
rights under the first amendment. Any further state interest such as value in-
culcation does not extend to the children of parents who opt to educate their
children privately.
Unfortunately, the test the courts currently use under the free exercise clause
has not provided sufficient protection to parents and children who want to be
different. Parental free exercise rights to educate their children as they see fit
are not protected nearly to the same degree as is speech under the free speech
clause, even though the values implicated are very similar.
A consistent free exercise clause standard which conforms to the greatest
extent possible with the principles underlying the free speech court decisions
is needed. The validity of the sincerity of a person's belief and the authenticity
of the perceived burden on that belief should be presumed. The state concern
should be carefully analyzed and must not be abstract in nature. The only state
concern articulated thus far that meets these criteria is ensuring that children
receive the basic minimal skills to be self-reliant and competent citizens.
Last, there should be a presumption that private education programs do
further the state's interest unless the state can show a tangible deficiency. There-
fore, any state action taken to further its legitimate concern must be taken after
the fact to the extent possible. To prevent irreparable impairment to the state's
interest in education, the state cannot wait until a child completely finishes school
before acting. The state can delay, however, until the completion of each school
year.
A measure which conforms to these guidelines but yet still protects paren-
tal liberty is annual evaluation through standardized testing or some other means
such as oral question-and-answer periods. Since resources to accomplish these
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evaluations need not come necessarily from the state, the process will not be
an excessive burden on the state education system. Moreover, resources may
actually be freed up because the monitoring system will look only at the results
of education rather than the means of education. Although testing may not be
sufficient in all situations, development of alternative, unintrusive measurements
is an achievable task if educators and parents commit themselves.
Finally, it must be remembered that the issue of parental rights to struc-
ture their children's education concerns values that go far beyond administra-
tive costs and methods of evaluation. The most compelling justification for a
revised standard for free exercise claims against state regulation of private edu-
cation is the extra liberty and protection that the proposed revision provides.
